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Abstract—Security-critical systems typically place some
requirements on the behaviour of their users, obliging them
to follow certain instructions when using those systems.
Security vulnerabilities can arise when users do not fully
satisfy their obligations. In this paper, we propose an
approach that improves system security by ensuring that
attack scenarios are mitigated even when the users deviate
from their expected behaviour. e approach uses structured
transition systems to present and reason about user obli-
gations. e aim is to identify potential vulnerabilities by
weakening the assumptions on how the user will behave. We
present an algorithm that combines iterative abstraction and
controller synthesis to produce a new soware specication
that maintains the satisfaction of security requirements while
weakening user obligations. We demonstrate the feasibility
of our approach through two examples from the e-voting and
e-commerce domains.
Index Terms—System security, user behaviour, e-voting
I. Introduction
A recent survey by the UK Government shows that human
behaviour such as sta not adhering to organisational policies
contributes to 42% of security incidents [1]. For such reasons,
users are oen seen as the “weakest link” in the security chain.
In this paper, we focus on security vulnerabilities that emerge
when users fail to satisfy their obligations fully. We argue that
in many cases, there are alternative designs for the soware
in which the system satises its security requirements even
when a user deviates from the expected behaviour, and we
propose a systematic approach to achieve them.
Research in the eld of usable security has argued that the
deviation of user behaviour is oen justied because many of
these instructions are arbitrary (e.g., mixing of character types
in passwords), unrealistic (e.g., requiring dierent passwords
for each account [2]), ineective (e.g., users having to change
passwords every 90 days leads to weaker passwords [3]), or
cumbersome (e.g., requiring users to conrm before every
critical action). Security mechanisms can therefore cause
friction in the way users want to interact with systems, and
their usability is therefore critical for their acceptance by
users (and ultimately their eectiveness). However, focusing
on user behaviour alone is insucient and equal, if not bigger,
importance should be given to the design of the associated
soware systems [4].
In this paper, we propose an approach, called OASIS
(Obligations, Aack scenarios, SpecIcation abstraction, and
Synthesis) that relaxes some of the obligations of the users
while satisfying security requirements by generating a revised
specication of the associated soware. e contribution of
this paper is threefold.
1) A modelling process that makes explicit the components
of systems, their interaction, and users obligations. We
decompose the environment into a set of interacting
components in a way similar to problem frames [5]. To
support automated reasoning, we use existing formalisation
of protocol behaviour using nite state machines [6]
for each component. e aim is to make precise user
obligations and clarify the assumptions made for the design
of the soware, which in turn helps generate potential
aack scenarios that arise from failures of the users to
comply with those obligations.
2) An algorithm to generate revised specication for weakened
obligations. Once an aack scenario is identied, we pro-
pose an algorithm that integrates abstraction and synthesis
techniques in order to derive a revised specication that
xes the identied vulnerability and maintain the security
requirements satised under weaker assumptions about
user behaviour. By abstracting the specication rst, the
controller is able to change the sequencing of actions
rather than only blocking or allowing some actions in an
adversarial environment.
3) A demonstrator that shows that the revised soware
specication satises the security requirements even
though the users deviate from theirs obligations. We
implemented the OASIS approach on top of an existing
model checker, LTSA [7], and evaluated it with two
examples from the e-voting and e-commerce domains.
For example, we automatically revise the behaviour of
an e-voting application to avoid vote ipping even if users
forget to conrm their vote.
e remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the e-voting illustrative example. Section III
gives an overview of the approach. Section IV presents the
formalism we use to model socio-technical systems. Section V
details the OASIS approach and Section VI reports on the
implementation and the experiments conducted to validate
our approach. Section VII examines related work. Finally,
Section VIII concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. Motivating Example: Electronic Voting
In 2010 in Kentucky, eight co-conspirators were sentenced
to a total of more than 156 years in prison for electoral
fraud [8]. One of the methods used to steal votes involved the
touch-screen voting machine called iVotronic manufactured by
ES&S. When a voter enters the booth, the voter’s interaction
with the voting machine can be described as follows.
Step 1. Key in the voter ID & personal pin, and move to the
next step (password)
Step 2. Select candidate and move to the next step (select)
Step 3. Vote selected candidate and move to the next step
(vote), or return to Step 2 (back)
Step 4. Conrm the vote (conrm), or return to Step 3 (back)
In the above e-voting system, an important obligation of
the voter is that they complete the entire sequence until the
vote is conrmed in Step 4. e use of conrm action at the
end is a common heuristic for user interface design to ensure
that mistakes are prevented before a user performs a critical
action (this is known as the “error prevention” heuristic [9]).
Vulnerability and Aack. When voters used this system,
there were incidents where some voters mistakenly thought
that their vote had been counted aer the vote action, and
exited the voting booth. e corrupt election ocials, who
were allowed to go inside the booth aer the voter had exited
the booth, went inside, tapped ‘back’ twice, selected their
preferred candidate, before conrming the vote. is aack
is called “vote ipping”.
Fixing the vulnerability. ere are a number of potential
ways in which this vulnerability can be xed including:
(i) Make recruitment and monitoring of election ocials more
stringent.
(ii) Install booth doors preventing the voter from leaving
before conrming, or authenticate every person entering
the booth. is however makes voting booths less portable.
(iii) Give more eective instructions to voters so that they know
not to leave before conrming their vote. For example, this
may mean providing clearer signs on the display indicating
the progress of their interactions with the system. However,
interaction design techniques alone are oen insucient
to build secure systems and need to be combined with
soware and security engineering methods [10].
(iv) Modify the behaviour of the e-voting soware so that a
corrupt ocial cannot easily change the vote aer the
voter has le the booth, whether the voter has conrmed
their vote or not. is is a soware engineering challenge,
and our approach will focus on nding such a solution.
ere is a long line of work on formal verication of
security properties in electronic voting systems at dierent
levels of granularity: from cryptographic primitives, to high-
level protocols, to soware, to socio-technical systems (see
Fig. 1). We give examples of approaches dedicated to each
level of granularity on the le hand-side and illustrate their
meaning with the e-voting example on the right hand-side. e
OASIS approach focuses on the system level and is concerned
with identifying security vulnerabilities and resolving them
by controlling the soware behaviour, without necessarily
changing, constraining, or controlling the user behaviour as
described in the following section.
Socio-Technical Systems
Soware
Protocols
Primitives
e-Voting
iVotronic
TLS, SSH Authentication
Ciphers, Hash functions,
Signature schemes
reat Modelling e.g., [11],
Usable security e.g., [12]
Code Analysis e.g., [13]
Authentication protocols e.g., [14]
Cryptographic primitives e.g., [15]
Fig. 1: Security: Layers of abstraction
III. Overview of the OASIS Approach
To describe our approach more precisely, we formalise
it using Jackson and Zave’s framework for requirements
engineering [16]. is framework makes explicit the relation-
ship between requirements, specications, and environment
properties. It allows us to describe our approach precisely
without prescribing a specication or verication technique.
e OASIS (Obligations, Aack scenario, SpecIcation
abstraction, and Synthesis) approach aims to revise the
soware design to maintain the satisfaction of requirements
while weakening the expected behaviour of the users. To
do so, OASIS starts by modelling the socio-technical system
in order to identify the interactions between the soware
and the environment generally, and the users in particular.
is steps constructs an argument showing how the security
requirement Rs is satised by the soware specication M1
in the environment E1 that places strong obligations on the
users (i.e. M1, E1 |= Rs) as depicted in Fig. 2-¶. e soware
specication is described using Finite State Machines (FSM) [6].
e environment is made up of interacting components or
agents, each of which represented using an FSM. Requirements
are represented using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [17]. e
entailment M,E |= R holds when the soware specication
(machine) M satises the requirement R in the environment
E. Modelling is explained in Section IV.
OASIS uses then the model of the environment (E1) and the
successive weakening of the user behaviour to generate aack
scenarios, producing the model of an adversarial environment
(E2) where the security requirement is violated (M1, E2 6|=
Rs) as depicted in Fig. 2-·.
Once an aack scenario is identied, the behaviour of the
implemented soware system, together with the model of
the adversarial environment and the security requirements
are used to identify a revised specication: that is, we seek
M2 such that M2, E2 |= Rs. e revision stage (see Fig. 2-¸)
generates successively more abstract model M of the existing
specication M1, which is then used to synthesise a controller
C that ensures the satisfaction of the security requirement
in the adversarial environment. e revised specication
M2 is the result of controlling the abstracted specication
and removes the security vulnerability without changing the
behaviour of E2. e revision is minimal with respect to M1,
that is it involves modication of fewest alphabets in the
behavioural model of M1. We acknowledge that minimality
Elicit User
Obligations
M1, E1 |= Rs
Generate Aack
Scenarios
M1, E2 6|= Rs
Abstract Existing
Specification
Find M
Synthesise New
Specification
M2, E2 |= Rs
Revise Specication
1 2
3
E1
M1 E2, Rs
M
7 Fail
7 Fail 3 Revised Spec. M2
Fig. 2: Overview of the OASIS approach
may not be the sole criterion for selecting the appropriate
revision. For example, sub-minimal revision may oer beer
usability or performance. Indeed, while we focus on the
security requirements Rs for simplicity, other requirements
can be specied without loss of generality. We will explain
the modelling process in Section IV before detailing each step
of the approach in Section V.
IV. Modelling System Behaviour
e behaviour of a component species its interaction
with the environment and models how the actions of its
alphabet are coordinated in order to achieve the specied
functionality. We build upon state-of-the-art approaches to
formalise behaviour using Finite State Machines (FSM) [6].
Denition 1 (Finite State Machine (FSM)): An FSM is a
quintuple 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, F 〉 where
• Q is the set of states,
• Σ is the set of actions denoting the alphabet of the FSM,
• δ : Q× Σ→ Q is the transition function,
• q0 is the initial state, and
• F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
Example. e voting soware behaviour can be modelled
as shown in Fig. 3. Generally, we will abstract away a
sequence of soware-controlled action immediately followed
by the user-controlled action into one action. For example
the action password could be described as two actions, the
soware asking for password and the voter entering the
correct password.
0start 1 2 3 4
password
select vote
back
conrm
back
Fig. 3: Behaviour of the voting machine
Modelling socio-technical systems using a single FSM has
many limitations:
1) Soware is not the system, and the vulnerability is not in
soware. In the aack scenario discussed above, corrupt
ocials exploit the system behaviour not covered by the
model in Fig. 3. For example, the model only says how
the soware and voters interact but does not say anything
about who can enter and exit the booth at what points.
ere is a need to model the behaviour of the voter,
aacker, the booth as well as voting soware, individually
and together in order to identify and x the vulnerability.
2) e soware cannot observe every action in the system.
For example, the soware can observe the candidate
selected but not whether someone has entered or exited
the booth. Once authenticated, the soware does not know
who it is interacting with. e assumption that actions
subsequent to user authentication are always performed by
the authenticated user is unwarranted and is a security risk.
3) Actions such as password, are special because we can
assume that only the voters can perform the password
action. Both voter and aacker can perform all other actions.
erefore, analysing the structure and behavioural prop-
erties of the components involved in the system is central
to identifying and xing certain security vulnerabilities. e
OASIS approach uses Structured FSM (SFSM) to model socio-
technical systems. Similarly to Problem Frames [5] that de-
compose systems into multiple domains, SFSM structures the
socio-technical system into multiple interacting components,
each of which described as an FSM.
Denition 2 (Structured FSM (SFSM)): An SFSM is a tuple
〈B,m, controls〉 where
• B is a set of nite state machines where αF denotes
the alphabets of the FSM F ∈ B associated with one
component,
• m ∈ B is the FSM associated with the soware (machine),
and
• controls : B × B → 2Σ where Σ = ⋃
F∈B
αF is a function
that species that the shared alphabet a = controls(f1, f2)
is controlled by the FSM f1 and observed by another f2.
Note that controls(f1, f1) designates the hidden actions that
are internal to the component f1 ∈ B. We use the shorthand
controls(f1) =
⋃
f∈B
controls(f1, f) to identify all externally
visible alphabets .
We assume the following syntactic rules to ensure SFMS
models are well-formed.
• Every alphabet is controlled by a component (either shared
or hidden).
• Every component controls or observes some shared alphabet
(no component with hidden alphabets only).
• No alphabet is both hidden and shared at the same time.
e security properties are described using the alphabet
Σ of the SFSM while the alphabet that the machine can
observe and control is described using Σm, called specication
phenomena.
Denition 3 (Specication phenomena): Specication phe-
nomena Σm of a system described by an SFSM is:
Σm =
⋃
f∈B
controls(m, f) ∪ controls(f,m)
To avoid unwanted synchronisation between the FSM of
dierent components, an alphabet controlled by multiple
components in dierent state machines are relabelled by
prexing them with their respective components so that they
are distinguishable in the composed model. For example,
both the alphabets of the voter and the election ocial
include the enter and exist actions in their interaction
with the booth. In order to avoid the FSM of the voter
and election ocial from synchronising they are both suf-
xed: controls(Voter,Voting Booth) = {v.enter, v.exit} and
controls(Election Ocial,Voting Booth) = {eo.enter, eo.exit}.
e behaviour of the voting booth is a synchronisation of the
voter and election ocial behaviour. Fig. 4 shows that the
voter and the election ocial cannot be in the booth at the
same time. For now, we consider one voter and one voting
ocial in the model, but we consider a multitude of them in
Section VI-C.
0
start
1 2
v.enter
eo.enter
eo.exit
v.exit
Fig. 4: Voting booth behaviour
System modelling using SFSM addresses the three afore-
mentioned limitations:
1) We can distinguish between three kinds of actions [18]:
(i) machine-controlled actions the environment observes
(
⋃
f∈B
controls(m, v)), (ii) environment-controlled actions
the machine observes (
⋃
f∈B
controls(f,m)), and (iii)
environment-controlled actions the machine cannot control
or observe (Σ−Σm). By explicitly modelling the behaviours
of the soware (machine) and environmental components,
vulnerabilities due to interactions between components
can be analysed. For example, we can express who can
enter the voting booth and what is the state of the voting
machine when they enter.
2) By including actions of the environment which the machine
cannot observe in the analysis but restricting the alphabets
of the machine to the specication phenomena, we can
surface obligations placed on the environment that may
turn out to be too strong. In other words, the SFSM makes
explicit the interaction between the dierent components,
in particular between the machine and the users as well
as between the users and the environment.
3) By allowing that environment-controlled actions may be
controlled by a number of components, we can model
issues related to identity and authentication.
Using SFSM to describe both the structure and behaviour
of the soware system allows us to elicit and reason about
user obligations more precisely, which we will explain in the
following section.
V. The OASIS Approach
A. Eliciting User Obligations
In order to describe the user obligations assumed by
an implemented system, we model the system behaviour
including the behaviour of the machine and environment.
When modelling the machine, the focus is on the interactions
with the user rather than actions internal to the machine. e
rst step is to decompose the behavioural model according
to its dierent components, which involves developing an
FSM for each component. We then extend the model of user
behaviour with actions users control that machine cannot
observe. is may also involve adding new states as well as
new transitions.
Example. In the e-voting system, the assumed behaviour
of the voter can be developed by expanding the model in
Fig. 3 to include the enter and exit actions, which voter
can perform but the machine cannot observe as shown in
Fig. 5. e model emphasises that the voter enters the booth
before initiating a voting session and that the voter exits the
booth aer conrming the vote, hence the booth hides these
actions from the machine. However, the voter can actually exit
the booth at any time/state without the machine/soware
being able to detect this action. Since there are common
alphabets controlled by both voter and election ocial, they
are relabelled using action suxes.
0start 1 2 3 4
56
enter password
select vote
back
conrm
back
exit
Fig. 5: Assumed voter behaviour
Specifying security requirements Besides modelling the
system behaviour, we must also represent the security require-
ment (Rs) and show that the composed system behaviour
satises the security requirement.
Example. For the e-voting system, let us consider some
possible formulations of the security requirement “No Vote
Flipping” and they include the following (a voting session is
a trace of the behavioural model in Fig. 5):
R1 the conrmed vote in every voting session is for the
candidate selected by the voter in the session
R2 the person who conrms the vote must be the voter of
the session
R3 in every session, it must be the voter who chooses the
candidate, conrms the vote.
R4 election ocials can never select a candidate aer the
voter has entered the password
Although the requirement “No Vote Flipping” in Fig. 3 is the
relationship between the candidates each voter has selected
and the nal vote tally, the behavioural model does not say
anything about the vote directly. As a result, we cannot talk
about the vote count in R1 directly using LTL. We will restrict
our requirements to properties we can express in LTL, namely,
safety and progress properties. is oen means rewriting
the requirements [19]. We choose the stronger formulation
of the requirement for “No Vote Flipping”, i.e. R4 , which
can be expressed in LTL as (v.vote→ (¬eo.select)).
Since the machine cannot observe who performs the conrm
action, the specication cannot rely on the occurrence of
conrm action to satisfy the security requirement. e voter
in Fig. 5 is obliged to conrm the vote before leaving the
voting booth. It is easy to see that if the user fulls the
obligations, we can verify that the security property “No Vote
Flipping” is satised by the system through the entailment
M1, E1 |= Rs, where E1 is the environment where the voter
complies with their obligations.
B. Generating Aack Scenarios
Once user obligations have been identied, this step aims to
relax those obligations, creating a weaker, and more realistic,
environment E2 and identifying possible violations to the
security requirements with the existing machine specication,
i.e. counterexamples to the entailment M1, E2 |= Rs. In the
following, we describe each of these two steps and illustrate
them using the e-voting example.
Relaxing user obligations. e aim is to weaken the be-
haviour of the users so that 1) they are allowed to perform
actions in any order they like and 2) the machine can constrain
user behaviour only by dening valid action sequences the
user controls and the machine observes. In eect, the user
behaviour is a single state with all transitions returning to it.
Example. Fig. 6 shows the weakened behaviours of the
voter and the election ocial, where they are allowed to
perform actions in any order aer they have entered the
voting booth. is can be compared with the initial assumed
behaviour of, for example, the voter described in Fig. 5. In
other words, the machine must control the behaviour allowed
by the voter rather than obliging the voter to follow a specic
behaviour. Note also that apart from the password action, the
machine cannot dierentiate between the actions performed
by the voter and a legitimate or malicious ocial.
(Voter)
0
start
1
enter
select , vote, conrm, back
password
exit
(Voting Ocial)
0
start
1
enter
select , vote, conrm, back
exit
Fig. 6: Weakened behaviours of the voter and the voting ocial
Identifying requirements violation. Once the user obligations
are weakened, we can dene a more realistic behavioural
model of the environment by composing the behavioural
models of the component and reverify the requirement
entailment. Counterexamples are possible aack scenarios. e
behaviour of the system is the composition of all components
in the system. We can then use model checking to verify that
M1, E2 6|= Rs. Notice that E2 renes E1 by weakening user
behaviours and extending user alphabets, which may lead to
the violation of security requirements.
Example. e behaviours of the voter, election ocial,
voting booth and the machine are then composed to give
the revised system behaviour as shown in Fig. 7. is is the
behavioural model of the environment in which the e-voting
system will be used. Given the model, several counterexamples
to the security requirement that the election ocial cannot
select the vote can be generated. e aack scenario discussed
in Section II is highlighted in red doed lines, but the model
highlights several other aack scenarios as well. In short,
once the system has reached one of the red states (the voter
has given the password and has le the voting booth without
having conrmed the vote), the election ocial can conrm
the vote and thus violating the security requirement.
e machine can control only the ordering of the actions
password, select, vote, conrm and back . e machine cannot
observe the actions exit, and enter of the voter and election
ocial. It is dicult to dene the bad states because it depends
on who is controlling the transitions; even in Fig. 7, states
such as 21 and 22 or 31 and 32 are indistinguishable
for the machine; so are events such as v.select and eo.select.
What is needed is a re-design of the behaviour of the soware
system in order to prevent election ocials to alter a vote
even when the voter exits without conrming.
0start
11
12
61
21 31 41 51 65
62 63 64
22 32 42 52 66
v.enter
password
v.exit
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eo.exit
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Fig. 7: Expanded E-voting system behaviour
C. Revising Specication
Once an aack scenario is identied, we then need to revise
the specication M1 into a specication M2 that satises the
requirements Rs in the weakened environment E2 (E2 renes
E1). ere are three main cases for this revision depending
on the relationship between M1 and M2.
Case 1: M1 renes M2 and αM2 ⊆ αM1. If the revised
specication M2 is a renement, which implies that the
alphabet and the transitions are subsets of those in the original
specication, then nding δ such that δ,M1, E2 |= Rs is a
simple controller synthesis problem. For example, controller
synthesis approaches can nd a x where all back actions
are removed from the specication as depicted in Fig. 8. is
means that as long as the voter leaves the voting booth aer
selecting the candidate, the aacker cannot modify the vote.
0start 1 2 3 4
password select vote conrm
Fig. 8: A revised specication of the voting machine (the most
constrained)
D’Ippolito et al. [20] propose a multi-tier framework
whereby a stack of mediators are synthesised to satisfy
stronger requirements when making stronger assumptions
about the environment. For example, a two level stack would
be as follows.
Synthesise M1 such that E1,M1 |= R1,
Synthesise M2 such that E2,M2 |= R2,
E2 simulates E1, and M2 simulates M1
where in the higher tier, some strong assumptions about
the environment are made and strong guarantees provided
while weaker assumptions (E2 simulates E1) are made in
the lower rst tier but also weaker guarantees are provided.
Nevertheless, it is not always the case that the revised version
renes the original one while satisfying the same requirements.
For example, if we still need to avoid vote ipping while
allowing voter to change their selection before conrming,
then a dierent behavioural design of the machine is required.
Case 2: M2 does not rene M1 and αM2 6⊆ αM1. States and
alphabets can be added to and removed from the description
of the environment (which may also aect the specication
phenomena). is amounts to modifying the environment
so that the existing specication satises the requirement.
For example, this could be the addition of new states and
transitions to prevent the voter from leaving the booth before
conrming or enable the machine to observe or control the
enter and exit actions. As we have discussed in Section II,
this is outside the scope of this work.
Case 3: M2 does not rene M1 and αM2 ⊆ αM1. An
implemented design is a commitment to particular behaviour
where alternatives may be possible. Since some of the user
obligations have been removed, the users interacting with the
system perform actions in dierent sequences. As a result,
the machine can also modify its behaviour without changing
the set of actions it executes. erefore, we seek M2 that
is similar structurally to M1 and satises the requirements
M2, E2 |= Rs. e aim of this step is to revise some design
decisions in order to nd the implementation most similar to
M1 that maintains the satisfaction of the requirements and
prevents the aack scenario identied.
e primary focus of this work is on the last case and we
dene a revision algorithm that works in two iterative steps:
abstracting the existing specication and then synthesising a
controller that uses this abstract specication to synthesise a
new one that satises the given requirements.
Algorithm 1 for generating a revised specication takes
as inputs the behaviour model of the machine component
Algorithm 1: Generate Revised Specication
input :M1 = 〈Q,Σm, δ, q0〉: machine behavioural
model
E2: Environment behavioural model
Rs: Security requirements
output : {M2, Fail}
1 L ← orderedPowerSet(Σm);
2 while L 6= ∅ do
3 L← nextMinimalElement(L);
4 M ← minimize (〈Q, (Σm − L) ∪ {τ}, δ1, q0〉)
where ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σm · δ(q, a) = δ1(q, τ) if
a ∈ L and δ(q, a) = δ1(q, a) otherwise;
5 N ← minimize (〈Q,L ∪ {τ}, δ2, q0〉)
where ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σm · δ(q, a) = δ2(q, a) if
a ∈ L and δ(q, a) = δ2(q, τ) otherwise;
6 F ← M || N ;
7 synthesise C such that C,F,E2 |= Rs;
8 if C 6= Null then
9 M2 ← C || M;
10 return M2;
11 end
12 end
13 return Fail;
M1, and that of the environment composed behavioural
models of other components, and the security requirements
Rs expressed as an LTL property. e algorithm produces
either the behavioural model for the revised specication M2
or the special symbol Fail as its output.
First the algorithm constructs the poset L from the
alphabets in the input model M1, where members of the power
set are ordered by the subset relationship. In other words,
L = (2Σm ,⊆). is produces a laice where the smallest
element is the empty set and the greatest element is M1
(Line 1). is laice is used to loop on possible abstractions
of M1 by selecting the minimal element L from the laice
and removing it together with the complement subset from
the laice, i.e. L ← L− {L,Σm − L} (Line 3). Note that the
rst element in the laice is the empty set (∅) and therefore
in the rst iteration of the loop, M is assigned M1.
For each minimal element L, the algorithm constructs an
abstract state machine F that interleaves all the actions in L.
In a process algebraic form, this is done by composing two
state machines M and N . e state machine M is obtained by
removing all actions in L from M1. is is done by replacing
all the transitions involving those actions by silent transitions
(δ(q, a) = δ1(q, τ) if a ∈ L) and then minimising the resulting
state machine (Line 4).
e algorithm generates another state machine N by rst
hiding alphabets other than those from the set L, before
minimising it (Line 5). F , the parallel composition of M
and N (Line 6) is based on interleaving semantics where
the two components synchronise on shared actions (note
that αM ∩ αN = ∅ by construction) and can progress by
alternating at any rate the execution of their other actions.
M1 is one potential renement of F in which a particular
sequences of the actions in L is chosen.
e algorithm then aempts to synthesise the controller
C such that it can allow or block the actions of F in
order to satisfy the security requirements in the adversarial
environment E2 (Line 7). In other words, the synthesised
controller ensures that the composition of the behaviours
of the dierent components is deadlock-free and reaches a
state where the requirements are satised. ere are many
approaches to controller synthesis [21]–[27], and they dier
in their assumptions (e.g., system behaviour is deterministic)
and the expressiveness of the goals involved (e.g., dealing
with safety, liveness, or general LTL properties). Rather than
focusing on a specic approach for synthesis, we show how
these techniques can be extended through abstraction.
If the synthesis succeeds, the revised specication M2 is the
parallel composition of C and M ; the algorithm successfully
terminates by returning M2 (Line 10). If the synthesis fails,
the algorithm chooses the next set of alphabets from the
laice and repeats the loop. If no controller C is found at
the end of the loop, the algorithm returns the special symbol
Fail (Line 13).
Proposition 1: M generated in every iteration of the loop
in Algorithm 1 is an abstraction of M1.
Intuitively, M is obtained by removing some of the actions of
M1 and then later on changing their positions in F to obtain
dierent renements. Renement gives an intuitive notion of
correctness (especially for safety properties), and it has been
applied in the stepwise design and implementation of soware
systems, starting from their more abstract specication [28].
We prove the contrapositive that M1 is a renement of
M . As noted, in the rst iteration of the loop, M is M1, and
therefore M1 renes M in that iteration. As M is obtained by
hiding some of the alphabet L of M1 while maintaining the
same transition set which implies inclusion of the trace sets
since. By construction ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σm · δ(q, a) = δ1(q, τ)
if a ∈ L and δ(q, a) = δ1(q, a) otherwise where L is the
hidden alphabet in the given transition, δ and δ1 the transition
functions of M1 and M respectively.
Example. In the e-voting example, if we choose a subset
L = {password}, we obtain the abstract machine M , and
the corresponding complementary N depicted in Fig. 9.
eir parallel composition F means that the password action
can be placed at any stage between the actions of M ,
i.e. {select, vote, conrm, back}. Placing it before the select
action as in the original specication M1 depicted in Fig. 3 is
only one option or possible renement of F . We can run the
synthesis to generate a controller that controls the actions
of F to make the security requirements satised. However,
multiple possible revised specications can be obtained as
depicted in Fig. 10. When minimality is dened in terms of
overlap of transitions with the specication M1 then the rst
case (a) can be discarded. Alternatively, a partial specication
of M2 or some additional requirements can drive the choice
between cases (b) and (c). For example, case (b) prevents the
election ocials changing the vote but not conrming it.
M :
0start 1 2 3
select vote conrm
back back
||
N :
0start 1
password
Fig. 9: Abstraction and composition of the voting machine
(a)
0
start
1 2 3 4
select
password vote
back
conrm
(b)
0
start
1 2 3 4
select vote
password
back
conrm
back
(c)
0
start
1 2 3 4
select vote
conrm
back
password
back
Fig. 10: Possible revisions of the e-voting machine
VI. Evaluation
is section discusses the implementation of Algorithm 1
together with theoretical and practical evaluation of the algo-
rithm. e evaluation covers the following three properties
of our approach: 1) Complexity: we examine the theoretical
aspects of the OASIS approach and discuss its performance. 2)
Feasibility: we describe the implementation of the approach
on top of an existing model checker and show how it can be
used to identify an aack and revise the behaviour in two
scenarios. 3) Scalability: we measure the time and the size of
the search space when dealing with an increasingly complex
specication, which we obtain by varying the number of
voters, voting ocials, and voting booths. We show that,
although theoretically complex, OASIS can be applied at
runtime in practical cases (models with up to around 500
states and 4000 transitions). Finally, we discuss the limitations
and possible enhancements of our approach.
A. Complexity
In the general case, controller synthesis is known to be
computationally expensive [29]. Let us consider the synthesis
of a controller C that ensures the requirement Rs assuming
E2, i.e. the controller satises the formula φ ≡ E2 ⇒ Rs.
In other words, C |= φ. When φ is expressed as an LTL
formula, controller synthesis may reach complexity of double
exponent in the size of φ [29]. Yet for safety formulas as well as
subclasses of liveness formulas (e.g., GR(1) [30] or SGR(1) [26]),
the synthesis problem can be solved in polynomial time. Our
approach does not aim to improve the synthesis algorithm
per se. Instead, we rely on the extensive work that has
been developed in the area of controller synthesis and
reduce the size of the models provided as input to the
synthesis algorithm. In addition, the abstraction allows us to
redesign behaviour by moving actions, which is not possible
with existing synthesis approaches. e time complexity of
performing minimisation with strong equivalence is O(kn)
for an FSM with k transitions and n states [31] in general and
and O(klogn) for more ecient algorithms [32]. However,
the model checker we used, LTSA, implements a simpler
algorithm proposed by Holzmann [33], which is less ecient
theoretically but proves faster for practical uses [34].
e minimisation and synthesis are performed for a stack of
abstract FSM starting from the original/existing specication
and gradually abstracting it, until all possible partitions of the
alphabet have been explored. In the worst case scenario, this
would necessitate 2m−1 iterations for an existing machine
specication with a size m alphabet. However, although the
algorithm has an exponential complexity O(2m), one can
make use of the partial specication S to bound the possible
abstraction. In the e-voting example, constraints such as select
must precede vote, which must precede conrm considerably
reduce the search space. is is similar in principle to protocol
projections [35] with the image protocol explored through
possible partitions. A partial specication can guide the
exploration and reduce the processing time.
B. Feasibility
In order to validate our approach and give evidence of its
functional correctness, we have implemented the approach
using the LTSA model checker [7]. LTSA is a free verication
tool that can check safety and liveness properties of com-
municating processes. We built on the existing capabilities
of LTSA for behavioural analysis and used composition to
capture the specication of the controller. In the following, M1
is the behavioural model given in Fig. 3. E2 is the parallel
composition of the models for voting booth (Fig. 4), the
voter and the election ocial (Fig. 6). e aack scenario is
generated by checking the following LTL property.
assert NoEOSelectAfterVPassword
= [](v.vote −> [](!eo.select))
which produces the aack scenario in less than 1ms.
e complete specication and its explanation are available
at hps://github.com/amelBennaceur/oasis.
Case study: Session Hijacking via Cross-Site Scripting
To show applicability to other domains, we consider an
e-commerce web application. When a user is authenticated,
the application stores a session cookie (a random string)
inside the client browser, which is then used in subsequent
interactions between the client and the server. A class of
aacks called session hijacking happen when an aacker
manages to obtain the session cookies. is can happen when
the user unwiingly executes a malicious script hidden inside
a page or disguised as a link which reads the cookie and
sends it to the aacker.
Step 1. e user provides username and password to log in.
Step 2. If credentials are valid, the e-commerce website stores
a session cookie.
Steps 3 and 4. e user browses the catalogue and adds
items to basket.
Step 5. e user chooses a delivery address.
Step 6. e user may make payment to complete the pur-
chase.
Step 7. e user logs out from the site.
e session cookie generated and stored on the user’s
computer in Step 2 needs to be validated by the server in
each interaction. e cookies are valid for the entire session
until the user logs out in Step 6, or a period of inactivity
has occurred. In such cases, the user is asked to log in again
creating a new session cookie.
Vulnerability and Aack. A user may log in and keep the
session cookie on the computer for a length of time for
a number of reasons, such as taking a long time to make
purchase decisions and forgeing to log o aer deciding not
to buy anything. An aacker may steal the cookie via Cross
Site Scripting: a script that reads the cookie and sends it to
the aacker’s server may be executed when the user clicks
on a link. is means that there are four states (states 2 to 5),
when the system is vulnerable to session hijacking aacks.
An important obligation placed on the user is that aer
they have logged in, they make the purchase and log out,
AND never click on a link containing a script that steals
the cookie before logging out. e OASIS approach aims to
weaken this obligation while keeping the system secure.
0start
1 2 3 4 5
6browse
add
browse
add
login cookie address pay
logout
Fig. 11: Revised specication of a shopping session
One revised specication according to our approach is to
move the login and cookie events to immediately before the
address event so that the user only has to log in when they
are about to pay (see Fig. 11). e system is now vulnerable
to session hijacking aack in three states (states 3 to 5).
Although the number of vulnerable states is reduced by one,
the eliminated state tends to last longer, and therefore poses
a signicant security threat.
It is worth noting that this paern of authenticating users
(again) before escalating privilege can be observed in many
popular online applications: banking applications tend to
authenticate users when checking transactions, and again
before making transfers.
Modern web browsers also have partial defences against
session hijacking aacks: (i) HpOnly cookies cannot be read
by client-side scripts, (ii) when the aribute SameSite is set
to strict, cookies cannot be sent to a dierent domain, and
(iii) Content Security Policies can prevent execution of scripts
that are not white-listed by the application. ese techniques
are complementary in that they are designed to restrict access
to cookies inside the browser, while our focus is to reduce
the number of states when cookies are stored.
C. Scalability
In order to evaluate the scalability of our algorithm using
LTSA, we increase the size of the model by increasing the
number of instances of Voter and Election Ocial. Starting
with one voter and one election ocial, we increment them
alternately. Fig. 12 shows how the state space of the model,
time taken by the tool to synthesise the new specication, and
the amount of memory required by the tool as the number of
users increase. LTSA, wrien in Java, has a memory limitation
of 1GB on 32-bit machines. Aer a combined total of 26 users,
LTSA raises an out of memory error. e time required to
generate the counter example is negligible in all cases. Both
time and space required for the synthesis explodes quickly
as the number of users approaches 26. A large part of the
time ineciency is due to the minimise operation. e largest
model has a state space over 4× 1011, and is synthesised in
about 5 mins using 240 MB of RAM on a 32-bit laptop.
reats to Validity. ere are both internal and external
threats to validity in our evaluation. An internal threat
is related to the use of LTL to specify the requirements,
which could have limited expressivity especially in cases
relating to complex data structures. We also relied on the
operators available in LTSA (and associated process algebra
FSP) to implement the algorithm. Other model checkers
may have dierent operators or have built-in simplication
that give beer performance. Since the complexity of the
revision is exponential, nding the right level of abstraction to
analyse the behaviour of a system is paramount. For example,
increasing the number of users adds to the complexity without
necessarily uncovering dierent behaviours. With respect to
external threats to validity, OASIS was evaluated in two cases
for which we already knew about potential aacks. We plan
to conduct more extensive evaluation to investigate whether
the tool will identify false positive aacks which might have
been handled by other means (e.g., rewalls or human agents)
and how the revisions proposed are received by developers.
D. Discussion
Our initial evaluation demonstrated that OASIS can be used
to revise the soware specication to allow for weakened user
obligations thus improving overall system security (mitigating
more aacks). We made several simplifying assumptions in
order to implement and empirically evaluate our approach.
We discuss how some of these assumptions can be relaxed.
Minimality of revised specication. We have assumed that
revisions of the soware that involves fewer actions are
relatively minimal to those that involve more actions. is
may not be the case when the revision is translated into code.
is issue needs to be investigated in future work.
Generalisation. Being able to precisely determine the role
of the users and to make the soware resilient to deviation
in their behaviour is an important issue. is also raises the
question of how users interact when the machine itself is
made up of multiple components that collaborate in order to
satisfy security. We are applying the proposed approach to
practical problems in a number of domains. In particular, many
real-world examples will involve properties about data (such
as collection of the vote results) and multiple processes and
people. While this paper focuses on behavioural analysis,
existing work on synthesis also considers data ow and
associated control [36]. In addition, while the behaviour of
individual components are usually small, if all the components
in the environment are modelled the size of the composed
model may grow quickly, increasing the complexity of the
synthesis. Collaborative approaches to synthesis [37] provides
a way to manage this complexity in domains such as the IoT.
Applicability. We intend to conduct a more comprehensive
empirical study in order to evaluate relevance of the sug-
gested revisions, and compare their acceptability by soware
developers, who may not always follow security practices [38].
In particular, OASIS assumes that the requirements can be
expressed in LTL, which might not always be the case,
especially for cases relating to complex data structures.
e proposed revisions are based on changing the order
of actions or removing some actions while other potential
revisions might also involve frequency of actions or adding
actions. ese revisions might require techniques other than
automated synthesis and we plan to investigate whether these
revisions can be learnt. We also plan to evaluate the eort
required to assess the identied aack scenarios and the
willingness to address them by revising specications.
VII. Related Work
e proposed approach OASIS is related to existing research
in a number of areas, which as summarised below.
1) Requirements engineering for system security. Focusing
on security properties such as non-interference, Rushby [19]
argues that it is dicult to write security requirements because
some security properties do not match with behavioural
properties that can be expressed using formal methods.
However, at the system level, certain security requirements
such as preventing vote ipping can be described in terms of
safety and liveness properties. Looking at the system from
the point of view of an aacker is a common way of eliciting
security requirements, and is the basis of threat modelling and
aack tree approaches to security [11], [39]. Requirements
of an aacker are called negative requirements, or anti-
requirements [40]. Once identied, the soware engineer has
to design the system that prevents the anti-requirements from
being satised. e idea has been extended by considering
various paerns of anti-requirements, known as “abuse
frames” [41]. In goal-oriented modelling, anti-requirements
are called anti-goals, and the anti-goals can be rened in
order to identify obstacles to security goals, and generate
countermeasures [42]. In a similar vein, a systematic process
to analyse security requirements in a social and organisational
seing has been proposed [43]. e OASIS approach focuses
on the behaviour of users interacting with the soware, and
identies potential security vulnerabilities by weakening their
obligations. To the best of our knowledge, existing work has
not addressed this issue explicitly. Formal and semi-formal
argumentation approaches have been used to reason about
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Fig. 12: Evaluation of tool scalability
system security [44]. It is easy to argue that if the users fail
to discharge their obligations fully, then the soware system
cannot be expected to satisfy its security requirements. e
OASIS approach shows instead that it is oen possible to
weaken user obligations, and as a result the system becomes
more robust with respect to its security requirements.
2) Usable security. System security mechanisms are more
eective when they are user-friendly [12]. Other studies
of usable security have focused on the issues of password
policies [45], [46], user behaviour when confronted by security
warnings on web browsers [47], and so on. Shiing focus to
developers and their mistakes when writing security-critical
code, recent studies have examined the issue of the usability
of cryptographic APIs [48]. From the usability point of view,
the vote ipping problem discussed in this paper is known as
the “missed sub-goal problem”, and the general solution is to
focus on the simplicity of the path for users to achieve their
goal. It means for example, whether the language used is
appropriate, and whether the system states reect the mental
model of the user. Complementing these approaches, the
OASIS approach shows that the soware behaviour can be
designed so that the system remains secure even when the
user does not complete their tasks fully.
3) Formal verication of authentication protocols. Mead-
ows [49] surveys approaches to formal verication of au-
thentication protocols which include methods based on
communicating state machines, modal logics, and algebraic
models. Recognising that many authentication problems stem
from user behaviour, and not necessarily from the protocols
themselves, recent work has begun to examine the interactions
between user behaviour and authentication protocols (the
top layer in Fig. 2). Basin et al. [50], for example, focus
on modelling and reasoning about human error in security
protocols. First, they dene human error as deviation from
the role specication, which produces a partial order on these
errors. ey integrate the human error model within existing
formalisation of security protocols, and verify the security
properties of the security protocol under human errors.
However, unlike OASIS, their approach focuses on verication
rather than repair and operates at the protocol level.
4) Controller synthesis. ere are many approaches to medi-
ator synthesis [21]–[27], and they dier in their assumptions
and the expressiveness of the goals involved. It is not always
possible to synthesise a mediator that will maintain the
requirements satised whatever the environment properties.
D’Ippolito et al. [20] propose a multi-tier framework for
graceful degradation by switching machine specications,
which are organised as a stack where higher layers making
strong assumptions about the environment and providing
stronger guarantees. However, the environments and the
controllers must be in simulation. e OASIS approach relaxes
this assumption through iterative abstractions and synthesis.
VIII. Summary and conclusions
We have proposed an approach to identify vulnerabilities
due to strong assumptions about the user behaviour and
to update the soware specication to allow for weaker
assumptions about the user behaviour while maintaining
the satisfaction of the security requirements. e proposed
approach begins by formalising the structure as well as the
behaviour of a socio-technical system with critical security
requirements, which makes user obligations explicit and
enable us to identify aack scenarios. e approach then
alternates between abstraction and synthesis to generate a
revised specication that xes the identied vulnerabilities
and satises the requirements in the more realistic environ-
ment with weakened assumptions. We validated the approach
by applying it to the e-voting and e-commerce examples and
evaluating how it scales with a state space up to 4×1011. Our
approach goes beyond renement for the revised specication
and generates a specication that can change the sequencing
of existing actions controlled by the machine. e results
of the evaluation show that OASIS can identify security
vulnerabilities and resolve them by controlling the soware
behaviour without unnecessarily changing, constraining or
controlling the user behaviour.
We plan to carry out further application of the approach to
potentially discover new aack scenarios, identify more e-
cient methods for managing the iteration between abstraction
and synthesis, and explore notions of minimal change.
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Appendix
In the following we explain how LTSA operators are used to
implement Algorithm 1. Assuming L is {password} Lines [4—
6] are implemented using the hide (\), interface (@) and
minimisation (minimal) operators:
minimal||M = EM\{password}.
minimal||N = EM@{password}.
||F = (M||N).
In order to ensure that M and N are composed correctly,
action labels need to be prexed appropriately. We rst rebel
the voter and the election ocial before creating the model
for E2 (Line 7).
minimal||Sys0 = ({v}::F || v:Voter)
@{v.enter,v.password,v.select,v.vote,
v.back,v.confirm,v.exit}.
minimal||Sys1 = ({eo}::F || eo:EO)
@{eo.enter,eo.select,eo.vote,eo.back,
eo.confirm,eo.exit}.
||E2 = (Booth||Sys0||Sys1||{v,eo}::F).
Since LTSA does not allow us to state the requirement for
synthesis using LTL, we rephrase the security requirement
Rs as a behavioural model (NoEOConfirm) together with
a partial specication S before synthesising C .
S = (back−>back−>END).
property NoEOConfirm = (v.confirm −>
NoEOConfirm).
C = (S || Env || NoEOConfirm).
e rest of the algorithm is a wrapper to the
LTSA tool. e complete specication are available at
hps://github.com/amelBennaceur/oasis.
In the e-voting example, the aack scenario is generated
by checking the following LTL property.
assert NoEOSelectAfterVPassword
= [](v.vote −> [](!eo.select))
Assuming the behaviour models of the machine, voting
booth, voter and voting ocial specied in Fig. 3, 4, and 6
respectively, the following output is produced
Depth 9 −− States: 52 Transitions: 103
Memory used: 18610K
Trace to property violation in
NoEOSelectAfterVPassword:
v.enter
v.password
v.select
v.vote
v.exit
eo.enter
eo.back
eo.back
eo.select
Analysed in: 0ms
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